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CHAPI'ER I 
Introduction 
In general, public policy in the United States has been directed 
to maintaining competition. The belief has been that competiti ve 
free enterprise economy is the best means toward a higher standard 
of livin g and the preservation of personal freedom. In many indus-
tries, however, competition is imperfect. The electric power and 
natural gas industries are such activities. 
Nature of industry 
Electric power operations started on a small scale, with plan ts 
serving customers only in the immediate vicinity. Later, there was 
a period of short-lived competition, but the end result was city-wide 
and ultimately ar ea -wide consolidation. This caused the electric 
power industry to evolve into large scale firms. Plants are huge 
and hi ghly specialized, involvin g heavy investments and high fixed 
charges. These are built in anticipation of demand. Plants must be 
big enough to satisfy demand at its peak. The service they produce 
cannot be stored. The character of the industry probably makes 
monopoly the most efficient form of market organization, In general, 
the larger the plant, the lower the cost per kilowatt-hour, provided 
that there is enough business to keep it all in use. So, this indus-
try has decreasing cost, and is said to be a natural monopoly. 
2 
Two types of firms are straight utilities and combination 
companies. The straight utilities engage in selling gas or elec-
tricity only, The combination companies engaged in selling both gas 
and electricity have operated in the United States since 1883, 
Richard Hellman's opinion is: 
The persistance of monopoly over competition, including 
gas and electricity, is illustrated by Denver, Its 
first two franchises were granted in 1883 and 1887, 
shortly after which the holders combined and they merged 
with the gas lighting company for a function monopoly of 
the utility lighting.l 
In this study, the combination firm is defined broadly as a company 
which is engaged in selling both gas and electricity. 
The electric utility sells electricity to different classes of 
buyers. Different classes were established for residential, commer-
cial, and industrial users, Rates were differentiated from class to 
class; discrimination resulted. Discrimination occurs when rates 
are based upon differences other than cost. The elasticity of demand 
for residential users, commercial users, and industrial users varies 
from low to high in sequence, Rates will be set lower where demand 
is more elastic, Demand is more elastic where customers have less 
need for the service or less ability to pay for it, or where they 
can provide it for themselves or obtain it from a company's competi-
tor at a lower rate. Rates are kept high where demand is more 
inelastic, that is, where the buyer's need and ability to pay are 
great. Thus, the electric utility has good reason to set the lowest 
1Richard Hellman, Government Com etition in the Electric 
Utility Industry (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972, p, 9, 
prices for lar ge industrial users even where there is no cost advantage. 
Since t he larger user has t he alternatives of supplying his own power 
or locating in another part of the country, he has a much more elastic 
demand for electricity t han other buyers. Between the residential 
and commercial users, the elasticity of the corrunercial users' demand 
is hi gher than that of residential users, This is because large 
commercial us ers may find it possible to find some substitute source 
of power, as can the in dustrial users if the electrical rates are high. 
Thus, demand would be expected to be more elastic than that for resi-
dential users, but less t han industrial users . 
Discrimination serves the purpose of the utility. By discrimina-
tion among the custo mers, a company may expand its sales and enlarge 
its revenues. It may realize a fuller utilization of its facilities, 
spread its fixed cost over more units of output, and thus reduce its 
unit costs. 
Regulation 
It is the natural monopoly characteristic of the power industry 
which creates the need for regula tio n, For while a monopoly may 
operate as efficiently as a competitive ent erprise , and may provide 
services of equal quality, it is under less pr essure to do so. 
Similarly, while a monopoly may elect to sell at prices equal to 
those that might be secured under active competition, it is less 
likely to do so. 
As the economies of scale of combination companies makes high 
entry barriers to the market, a combination company may be referred 
to as a more "complete" monopoly. As a monopolist, the combination 
company has power to control over price and output, Therefore, he is 
not interested to produce to the point where marginal cost equals 
price, He realizes that a negatively sloping demand curve will 
cause the marginal revenue to be less than price as long as the slope 
of demand curve is less than zero. The quantity supplied under monopoly 
depends not only on marginal cost, but also on demand elasticity. 
The combination company has a profit incentive opportunity at the 
profit-maximizing output MR 1 MC; at any output, MR= P(l +~·he 
will set price and produce as depicted in Figure 1. 
Price 
p 
m 
p 
c 
0 
MR 
Figure 1. Price and supply under monopoly market 
LRAC (LRMC) 
Q/+ 
Compared to a competitive market, the combination company has 
power to set price higher, Pm"> Pc, and produce less output Qm< Q.c, 
as he is a monopolist. 
Since combination companies have the power over price and output, 
government has substituted administrative regulation for competition. 
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act passed in 1890, every contract, 
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. It 
provides the original legal base for the enforcement of competition 
in the United States, The law emphasized behavior (monopolization) 
rather than market structure (monopoly). In 1Gl4, Congress passed 
the Clayton Antitrust Act, which prohibited specific kinds of behavior, 
e.g., price discrimination, tied sales, and interlocking directorates. 
In the same year the Federal Trade Commission Act brought into being 
the Federal Trade Commission to j_nvestigate "unfair methods of compe-
tition" and to issue "cease and desist orders" against illegal prac-
tice, " .. , where the effect may be substantial to lessen competi-
tion or tend to create monopoly." In 1963, the Robinson-Patman Act 
strengthened the Clayton Act's provision against price discrimination; 
price differences had to be supported by cost differences, except 
where prices were lowered in good faith to meet competition in certain 
markets. In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act placed limitations on 
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mergers, plugging another of the Clayton Act's loopholes. 
The purpose of regulation is to impose price ceilings as a 
substitute for the automatic control of the competitive market mechanism. 
It is appointed to decide what price would provide a fair return on 
some reasonable assessment of the value of the capital investment. 
The combination company may be partially beyond the scope of 
regulation. It is a simple matter to issue an order forbidding new 
2 Allan J. Braff, Microeconomic Analysis (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1969), p. 156-7, 
b 
acquisitions of stock or assets, or to limit rate increases , but it 
is not so easy to break up a combination that has existed for many 
years . Combination companies are not within jurisdiction of anti-
monopoly laws which tend to give special status to regulated industries. 
Regulatory policy does permit the utility to classify its customers, 
thereby recognizing monopolistic class prices, but it does not permit 
experimentation with the quantity supplied and with the rates in 
order to determine the point of maximum return from the point of view 
of the producer alone . Public utility commissions, which are govern-
ment agencies which have the statutory responsibility to control the 
public utilities, must exercise control of the rate structure to assure 
equ ity among customers. The l ega l standards are broad, "First, each 
specific rate must be 'just' and 'r easonab le.' Second, 'undue' or 
'unjust' discrimination among customers is prohibited,"J The crux of 
regulation is control of rates. The general l eve l of rate is controlled 
to prevent monopolists from charging prices and obtaini.ng monopoly 
profit. 
A commission has authorization in controlling the regulated 
industries . From the economist's point of view, the goals of the 
commissions are: "(a) to induce a more nearly equal distribution 
of income, and (b) to increase economic efficie ncy. 114 
The pursuit of an efficiency goal consistent with an income goal 
is bound to be demanding, Under these circumstances, what policie s 
and procedures does the commission choose? 
3charles F, Phillips, Jr., The Economics of Regulation (Illinois: 
Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. J04. 
4 Stephen G, Breyer and Paul W. Maccavoy, Energy Regulation by the 
Federal Power Commission (Washington, D,C,: The Brooking Institution, 
1974), p. J. 
First, the commission committed itself to setting 
prices equal to the costs of service, Elaborate proce-
dures were estab lish ed for determining investment cost-
procedures for averaging past figures, collecting large 
amounts of accounting information, and listening to ex-
perts present their individual opinions about cost factors 
in great detail at numerous hearings. Somewhat simpler, 
more mechanical procedures were used by the commission 
to determine operating costs of the regulated companies, 
but all in all this style of regulation is laborious. 
Second, the commission sought "quality" service. 
It employed complex methods to calculate efficient scales 
and adequate reserves in given instances, In the case 
of electric power companies especially, numerous rulings 
about plant layout and interconnection were laid down.5 
Objective of paper 
7 
In this paper, multiple regression analysis was used to determine 
whether regulation is effective. The study was based on two related 
theories: first, that the electric utility is a natural monopoly, 
having economies of scale, and second, that the standard of performance 
of the commission's regulation is what would be obtained in a hypothe-
tical competition. The criteria should be set up before the statistical 
test is stated: 
1. If the rate structure was set by a commission, it would imply 
that the regulation is effective. There should be no difference be-
tween rate structure of combination companies and other utilities. 
2. If the rate structure was set by a firm, it would imply that 
the regulation is not effective: combination company rate structure 
may dif fer from those of straight utilities, 
Chapter two is a theoretical model, Chapter three takes up with 
the analysis of data and the final chapter is the empirical results 
and swnmary, 
5Ibid., p, 4, 
CHAPTER II 
Theoretical Model 
In studying rate structure, two ratios are used, P. represents lr 
the rate of the price charged to industrial users to that of residential 
users, while P. is the rate of the price for industrial users to that 
lC 
of commercial users. The model assumes the following variables may 
affect rate structure: 
x1 : Combination variable, it will be equal to one for the 
single company, and will equal to zero for the combination 
company. If the value approaches one, this means that 
there is more competition. 
X2 : Population density (population per square mile), 
x3 : Per capita income, 
x4 : Average temperature during November-March, 
x5 : Average temperature during April-October. 
x6: Value added of manufacturing. 
x7: Fuel cost. 
The rate structure equation is assumed to be as follows: 
1. 
2. 
P. lr 
P. 
lC 
The expected signs of the a. and b. are discussed in the para-
l l 
graphs which follow. 
9 
Combination companies 
If the regulation is effective, that means the commission sets 
prices. The industry would like to base its rate structure on elas-
ticity of demand. So, differences in elasticity of demand are accompani-
ed by changing prices and quantiti es . But, effective regulation does 
not permit the regulated industry to practice this extreme price 
discrimination. Hence, effective regulation should result in ratios 
of prices to different users which are independent of whether the firm 
is a straight or a combination utility. 
d P. ir 
d x1 
d P. 
lC 
d x1 
That is: 
0 
0 
Alternatively, if regulation is not effective, then: 
d P. 
lC 
d x1 
0 
+ 0 
When the combination variable increases, that means that more 
competition exists in the market. The electricity demand curve of 
industrial, commercial, and residential users would become more elastic, 
from the view of the electric company. The situation is as follows: 
1, For a combination company, if there is a shift between gas 
and electric, it still provides revenue for the firm. 
2. For a single company, the shift from electricity to gas 
causes the firm to lose revenue, 
10 
J. When the elasticity of demand for electricity approaches 
zero, this implies littl e shift to gas if electricity prices increase, 
If the elasticity of demand approaches infinity, it implies a large 
shift if prices increase. Thus, a non-combination company attempting 
to practice pric e discrimination would increase t he price to users 
with inelastic demand more than for users with elastic demand, A 
combination company would have less incentive to adjust prices in 
this manner because of its benefit s from shifts from electricity to gas. 
Because demand of residential and commercial users is relatively 
more inelastic than that for indu stria l users, a non-combination 
company would tend to charge resid ent ial and commercial users rela-
tive ly higher prices. Thus, as x1 increases: 
IJ.. P.)AP , fl P 
l r c 
Hence, it is reasonable to expect that: P. and P. would 
lr lC 
go down, when the combination variable went up, or: 
d P. 
ir 
---d x1 
d P. 
lC 
---d x1 
Population density 
< 0 
< 0 
As the market becomes more dense, unit costs decrease, but more 
so for residential users. Hence, price to residential users decreases, 
while price to other users is little affected. 
Pr ice Price 
D 
c 
11 
Pri r_,,_ 
D 
0 Q./+ Q,/+ r. Q.,/+ 
T.ndustri a l u se r s ' Commercial us er s ' 
fi gur e 2 . Population den sFr rnd u ser pric , .-
So, when x2t 9 Pri; But A Pi and /). Pc O 
Therefore, it can be expected that when population density went 
up, P. woul d decrease , but P. would not be chan ged . 
lr lC 
d P. ir 
---d x2 
d P. 
lC 
---d x2 
Per ca pita in come 
> 0 
0 
The hi gher per capita income, t he more elas tic the residential 
,~emc:..nd curve would be expec ted to be. This ca us es the price to go 
down. For industrial and commercial users, there will probably be 
l ess an effect because they produc e to serve na tio nwide, 
Price 
P. 
l 
Industrial users' 
Pric e 
p 
c 
0 
Commerci?, l users ' 
Figure J . Per -ca pi ta in co me and use r prices 
So, the expectation is: 
d P. lr 
d x3 
d P. 
lC 
d x3 
Climate - winter 
> 
But Di. P. , Di. P 
l c 
0 
0 
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Price 
Q./+ 
Residential use r s ' 
0 
In especially cold areas the demand for gas and electricity 
for heating increases. Gas and electricity are substituted in heatin g . 
Thus, in cold areas t he residential demand curve becomes more elastic 
because of competition from gas. However, for industrial users, price 
D' 
r 
Q./+ 
should be less affected because heating is a small part of total demand 
J...) 
and they consider substitute energy forms even in warm climates. 
Price Price Price 
~Pc 
i pr 
P • P ' r 
c 
P. 
l D. 
l 
MR 
0 Q./+ 0 0 
Industrial users' 
Q., + 
Commercial users' Residential users' 
Fi gure 4, Climate and user prices: Winter 
So, it can be expected that: 
Thus, P. and P. would go up . 
IT lC 
d P. 
> ir ---d x4 0 
d P. 
> lC ---d x4 0 
Climate - $Ummer 
But AP. 
l 
0 
Greater air-conditionin g demand implies that residential 
elasticity demand curve is more elastic in that both gas and elec-
tricity can be used for air-conditionin g, Hence , the residential 
D I 
r 
Q./+ 
users' price and the commercial us ers ' price would go down, but there 
is pro bab ly little effect to ind ustrial users. 
Price Price Price 
p 
+Pc, 
f ;r, 
c 
P. 
l 
D. 
l 
MR 
0 + 0 Q. + 
Industrial us 2rs ' Commercia l users' 
Figur e 5, Climate and user pric es: Summer 
So, it can be expected that: 
d P. ir 
---d x5 
d P. 
lC 
d x5 
The value added 
Al ..::,P PI 
c -, r ' c~ 
) 0 
> 0 
But /). P. 
l 
r 
Residential us ers ' 
0 
Value added involves the industrial users' price. Because, the 
increase in value added means an increase in industrialization, A 
cause of industrialization is low energy price in the past, High 
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energy prices result in movement of industry out of the region. To 
hold industry, the industrial users' price must be kept low, 
Price Price 
p 
c 
.\. P. 
' p ~ t ·t,,----"""r-+--_.;;::--
l 
0 Q./+ 0 
D 
c 
Q,/+ 
Industrial users' Commercial users' 
Figure 6. Value added and user prices 
The expectation is as follows: 
x6 1 ~ P . ,l,i ; But A P and t:. P o -r i r c 
d P. lr 
d x6 
0 
d P. 
lC < ---d x6 0 
Fuel cost 
Price 
p 
r 
0 
MR 
Residential user s ' 
The relationship between Pir and x7 and Pie and x7 cannot be 
established on a theoretical basis, but is an empirical question, 
Q,/+ 
D 
r 
lb 
CHAPI'ER III 
Analysis of Data 
The data for this study are collected from: Performance Profiles 
Private Electric Utility in the United States 1963-1966, Statistics of 
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, 1966, and 
the Statistical Abstract, 1967, The data of forty -se ven states were 
collected (Hawaii, Alaska, and Nebraska were omitted), The ratio of 
customers' price is defined as the ratio of total revenue to total 
amount of kilowatt-hour sold in each state, The independent variables 
for the regression equations are P. and P. 
lr lC 
and are the industrial 
users' price divided by the residential users' price and the industrial 
users' price divided by the commercial users' price, respectively, 
The combination variable, x1 , is the net electrica l plant 
divided by the net electrical plant plus net gas plant, So, the lower 
in combination variable means the higher the concentration in combina-
tion in the market of that state, On the other hand, if the combina-
tion variable is equal to one in certain states, the business will 
be run in the single company form, 
The population density variable is population in each state 
divided by area in square miles, 
The per capita income variable is the average income of the 
people in each state in 1966, as reported in the Statistical Abstra ct, 
~. 
lj 
The average temperature during t he period of November to March 
and the averag e temperature during the period of April to October 
are normal monthly average temperatures , based on standards of a 
JO-year period, 1931 to 1960. The average temperature during 
November to March is calculated by addin g the average monthly 
temperatures from November to March together, dividing by six; 
using the same method, the climate for summer is fou nd, 
Value add ed of manufacturin g was taken from t he Statistical 
Abstract also, but the data in 1966 are not available. So, in this 
study the value added in 1967 are used, This variable indica tes 
the concentration of the indus try in each state. 
The fuel costs were taken · from the Statistics of Privately 
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, The uni t of the 
fuel cost is BTU/CENTS in 1966 of eac h state . 
CHAPI'ER IV 
Empirical Results 
In this chapter, the empirical results are presented to test 
the hypothesis of Chapter II. The result of the ordinary least 
square estimation equation, with P. and P. as the independent 
lY lC 
variables, is shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1. Regression result: industrial and residential prices 
Variable Regression Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant term 0.607 1. 772 
Combinatio n variable -0.00J -l.RR9 
Population density -0.001 -O. J02 
Per capita income 0.001 o.6oR 
Climate - winter O.OOJ 1.07 
Climate - summer -0.001 -0 .198 
Value added -0.001 -1.42 
Fuel cost - 0 .002 2.JJ 
R2 0.237 Number of observations 47 
.l 'j 
Table 2. Regression result: industrial and commercial prices 
Variable Regression Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant term 0,382 1.11 
Combination variable -0.004 -2.06 
Population density -0,001 -0,487 
Per capita income 0.001 1.113 
Climate - winter 0,002 0. 7S6 
Climate - summer 0.003 o.666 
Value added -0.001 -0. 714 
Fuel cost 0.002 l .,C\4 
R2 0. 2127 Number of observations 47 
As expected, the regression reveals a negative sign of regression 
coefficience between both P. , P. and combination variables, The ir lC 
significance levels are 90 and 95 percent, respectively. 
It was expected that the relationship between P. and population ir 
density would be positive, while we could not determine the relation-
ship between P. and population density. The regression result 
lC 
indicates the negative sign of coefficient. So, it means that the 
price of residential users did not go down because of the increasing 
of population density as expected, but it went up. This should imply 
that with the increase in population growth, the company has to 
20 
increase some cost in producing services, e.g., the fuel cost. Thus, 
the relationship of regression reveals ne gative sign. Both of them 
are non-significant. 
The per capita income coefficient has positive sign in relation 
to P. as was expected, but the relationship with P. was not deter-
ir lC 
mined at all on a prior basis, The coefficient is not significant 
in t he first equation, but the second one is significant at the 90 
percent level. 
The coefficient of the winter climate variable provides results 
as expected in both equations, The coefficient of the first equation 
is significant at the 90 percent level, but the second one is non-
significant. 
In the coefficient of the summer climate variable, the second 
equation was ne ,;:a t ive sign as viewed, but the first one was not as 
expected, It is probably because of the residential users' lack of 
an alternative to bargain the price with the company, so the resi-
dential users' price was not decreased as ex pected, Both coefficients 
are non-significant. 
The value added coefficient has a ne gative sign as expected in 
both equations . The significant level of the coefficient is 90 
percent in the first equation, while the second one is non-signi fi -
cant. 
The sign of the fuel cost coefficient was not predicted. The 
results are negative and positive signs in the first and second 
equatio n, respectively, and the significance levels are 95 percent 
and 90 percent. 
21 
Summary 
2 Both of the regression equations have a very low R and ther e 
are few significant coefficients. However, the expectation of the 
relationship between the independent variab les and the dependent 
variables indicated in Chapter II based on economic theory are 
right for most of them. Although relationships of the variables 
are not good, they are still consistent with theory . In this study, 
the variables are generated in log form also. The relationships 
are genera lly the same, but the R2 in both equations in log form 
are lower than the two equations reported here. 
In regard to the effectiveness of regulation, the hypothesis 
t hat regulation is effective is rejected. Combination companies 
have different rate structures than straight electric utilities. 
This should not be the case if the commissions made decisions which 
are independent of the nature of the company . 
22 
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